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Abstract—Due to the rapid development of the Internet in
recent years, the need to find new tools to reinforce trust and
security through the Internet has became a major concern. The
discovery of new pseudo-random number generators with a
strong level of security is thus becoming a hot topic, because
numerous cryptosystems and data hiding schemes are directly
dependent on the quality of these generators. At the conference
Internet‘09, we have described a generator based on chaotic
iterations, which behaves chaotically as defined by Devaney. In
this paper, the proposal is to improve the speed and the security
of this generator, to make its use more relevant in the Internet
security context. To do so, a comparative study between various
generators is carried out and statistical results are given. Finally,
an application in the information hiding framework is presented,
to give an illustrative example of the use of such a generator in
the Internet security field.
Keywords-Internet security; Chaotic sequences; Statistical
tests; Discrete chaotic iterations; Information hiding.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development and popularity of the Internet, and its
recent role in everyday life implies the need to protect data
and privacy in digital world. This development has revealed
new major security issues. For example, new concerns have
recently appeared with the evolving of the Internet, as evoting,
VoD or intellectual property protection. The pseudo-random
number generators (PRNG) play an important role in all of
these emerging techniques, because they are fundamental in
cryptosystems and information hiding schemes. PRNGs are
typically defined by a deterministic recurrent sequence in
a finite state space, usually a finite field or ring, and an
output function mapping each state to an input value. This is
often either a real number in the interval (0, 1) or an integer
in some finite range [8]. Conventionally, PRNGs based on
linear congruential methods and feedback shift-registers are
popular [6].
To use a PRNG with a large level of security is necessary to
satisfy the Internet security requirements recalled above. This
level depends on the proof of theoretical properties and results
of numerous statistical tests. Many PRNGs have been proven
to be secure, following a probabilistic approach. However,
recently, several researchers have been exploring the idea of
using chaotic dynamical systems for this purpose [5] [3]. The
random-like, unpredictable dynamics of chaotic systems, their
inherent determinism and simplicity of realization suggest
their potential for exploitation as PRNGs. Such generators
can strongly improve security in information hiding and
cryptography: due to unpredictability, the possibilities offered
to an attacker to achieve his goal are drastically reduced. For
example the keys of cryptosystems need to be unpredictable
enough, making it impossible for any search optimization
based on the reduction of the key space to the most probable
values. But the number of generators claimed as chaotic,
which actually have been proven to be unpredictable (as it
is defined in the mathematical theory of chaos) is very small.
This paper extends a study initiated in [2] and [13], and
tries to fill this gap. In [2], it is proven that chaotic iterations
(CIs), a suitable tool for fast computing iterative algorithms,
satisfies the topological chaotic property, as it is defined by
Devaney [4]. In the paper [13] presented at Internet‘09, the
chaotic behavior of CIs is exploited in order to obtain an
unpredictable PRNG, which depends on two logistic maps.
We have shown that, in addition of being chaotic, this gener-
ator can pass the NIST (National Institute of Standards and
Technology of the U.S. Government) battery of tests [11],
widely considered as a comprehensive and stringent battery of
tests for cryptographic applications. In this paper, we have im-
proved the speed and security of the former generator. Chaotic
properties, statistical tests and security analysis [14] allow
us to consider that this generator has good pseudo-random
characteristics and is capable to withstand attacks. Moreover,
its high linear complexity and its large key space lead to the
conviction that this generator is suitable for applications in the
Internet security field. After having presented the theoretical
framework of the study and a security analysis, we will give
a comparison based on statistical tests. Finally a concrete
example of how to use these pseudo-random numbers for
information hiding through the Internet is detailed.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following way. In
Section II, some basic definitions concerning chaotic iterations
and PRNGs are recalled. Then, the generator based on discrete
chaotic iterations is presented in Section III. Section IV is
devoted to its security analysis. In Section V, various tests are
passed with a goal to achieve a statistical comparison between
this new PRNG and other existing ones. In Section VI, a
potential use of this PRNG in some Internet security field is
presented, namely in information hiding. The paper ends with
a conclusion and intended future work.
II. BASIC RECALLS
A. Notations
J1;NK → {1, 2, . . . , N}
Sn → the nth term of a sequence S = (S1, S2, . . .)
vi → the ith component of a vector
v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn)
fk → kth composition of a function f
strategy → a sequence which elements belong in J1;NK
S → the set of all strategies
C
k
n → the binomial coefficient
(
n
k
)
= n!
k!(n−k)!
⊕ → bitwise exclusive or
+ → the integer addition
≪ and ≫→ the usual shift operators
(X , d) → a metric space
⌊x⌋→ returns the highest integer smaller than x
n!→ the factorial n! = n× (n− 1)× · · · × 1
N
∗→ the set of positive integers {1,2,3,...}
B. Chaotic iterations
Definition 1 The set B denoting {0, 1}, let f : BN −→ BN
be an “iteration” function and S ∈ S be a chaotic strategy.
Then, the so-called chaotic iterations are defined by [12]
x0 ∈ BN,
∀n ∈ N∗, ∀i ∈ J1;NK, xni =
{
xn−1i if Sn 6= i
f(xn−1)Sn if Sn = i.
(1)
In other words, at the nth iteration, only the Sn−th cell is
“iterated”. Chaotic iterations generate a set of vectors (boolean
vectors in this paper), which are defined by an initial state x0,
an iteration function f , and a chaotic strategy S.
C. XORshift
XORshift is a category of very fast PRNGs designed by
George Marsaglia [9]. It repeatedly uses the transform of
exclusive or (XOR) on a number with a bit shifted version
of it. The state of a XORshift generator is a vector of bits.
At each step, the next state is obtained by applying a given
number of XORshift operations to w-bit blocks in the current
state, where w = 32 or 64. A XORshift operation is defined
as follows. Replace the w-bit block by a bitwise XOR of the
original block, with a shifted copy of itself by a positions
either to the right or to the left, where 0 < a < w. This
Algorithm 1 has a period of 232 − 1 = 4.29× 109.
Input: the internal state z (a 32-bits word)
Output: y (a 32-bits word)
z ← z ⊕ (z ≪ 13);
z ← z ⊕ (z ≫ 17);
z ← z ⊕ (z ≪ 5);
y ← z;
return y;
Algorithm 1: An arbitrary round of XORshift algorithm
III. THE NEW GENERATION OF CI PSEUDO-RANDOM
SEQUENCE
A. Chaotic iterations as pseudo-random generator
1) Presentation: The novel generator is designed by the
following process. First of all, some chaotic iterations have
to be done to generate a sequence (xn)n∈N ∈
(
B
N
)N
(N ∈ N∗,N > 2, N is not necessarily equal to 32) of
boolean vectors, which are the successive states of the iterated
system. Some of these vectors will be randomly extracted
and our pseudo-random bit flow will be constituted by their
components. Such chaotic iterations are realized as follows.
Initial state x0 ∈ BN is a boolean vector taken as a seed (see
Section III-A2) and chaotic strategy (Sn)n∈N ∈ J1,NKN is an
irregular decimation of a XORshift sequence (Section III-A4).
The iterate function f is the vectorial boolean negation:
f0 : (x1, ..., xN) ∈ BN 7−→ (x1, ..., xN) ∈ BN.
At each iteration, only the Si-th component of state Xn is
updated, as follows: xni = xn−1i if i 6= Si, else xni = xn−1i .
Finally, some xn are selected by a sequence mn as the
pseudo-random bit sequence of our generator. The sequence
(mn)n∈N ∈ MN is computed from a XORshift sequence
(yn)n∈N ∈ J0, 232−1K (see Section III-A3). So, the generator
returns the following values:
Bits:
x
m0
1 x
m0
2 x
m0
3 . . . x
m0
N
x
m0+m1
1 x
m0+m1
2 . . . x
m0+m1
N
x
m0+m1+m2
1 . . .
or States:
x
m0
x
m0+m1
x
m0+m1+m2
. . .
2) The seed: The initial state of the system x0 and the
first term y0 of the XORshift are seeded either by the current
time in seconds since the Epoch, or by a number that the user
inputs, as it is usually the case for every PRNG.
3) Sequence m of returned states: The output of the
sequence (yn) is uniform in J0, 232−1K, because it is produced
by a XORshift generator. However, we do not want the output
of (mn) to be uniform in J0, NK, because in this case, the
returns of our generator will not be uniform in J0, 2N − 1K,
as it is illustrated in the following example. Let us suppose
that x0 = (0, 0, 0). Then m0 ∈ J0, 3K.
• If m0 = 0, then no bit will change between the first and
the second output of our PRNG. Thus x1 = (0, 0, 0).
• If m0 = 1, then exactly one bit will change, which leads
to three possible values for x1, namely (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0),
and (0, 0, 1).
• etc.
As each value in J0, 23 − 1K must be returned with the same
probability, then the values (0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and
(0, 0, 1) must occur for x1 with the same probability. Finally
we see that, in this example, m0 = 1 must be three times more
probable than m0 = 0. This leads to the following general
definition for m:
mn = f(yn) =


0 if 0 6 y
n
232 <
C0N
2N
,
1 if C
0
N
2N
6
yn
232 <
∑1
i=0
CiN
2N
,
2 if
∑1
i=0
CiN
2N
6
yn
232 <
∑2
i=0
CiN
2N
,
.
.
.
.
.
.
N if
∑N−1
i=0
CiN
2N 6
yn
232 < 1. (2)
4) Chaotic strategy: The chaotic strategy (Sk) ∈ J1, NKN
is generated from a second XORshift sequence (bk) ∈
J1, NKN. The sole difference between the sequences S and
b is that some terms of b are discarded, in such a way that:
∀k ∈ N, (SMk , SMk+1, . . . , SMk+1−1) does not contain a
same integer twice, where Mk =
∑k
i=0m
i
. Therefore, no bit
will change more than once between two successive outputs
of our PRNG, increasing the speed of the former generator
by doing so. S is said to be “an irregular decimation” of b.
This decimation can be obtained by the following process.
Let (d1, d2, . . . , dN ) ∈ {0, 1}N be a mark sequence, such
that whenever
∑N
i=1 d
i = mk, then ∀i, di = 0 (∀k, the
sequence is reset when d contains mk times the number 1).
This mark sequence will control the XORshift sequence b as
follows:
• if dbj 6= 1, then Sk = bj , dbj = 1 and k = k + 1
• if dbj = 1, then bj is discarded.
For example, if b = 1422334142112234... and m = 4241...,
then S = 1423 34 1423 4... Another example is given in
Table II-C, in which r means “reset” and the integers which
are underlined in sequence b are discarded.
B. CI(XORshift, XORshift) algorithm
The basic design procedure of the novel generator is
summed up in Algorithm 2. The internal state is x, the
output state is r. a and b are those computed by the two
XORshift generators. The value f(a) is an integer, defined as
in Equation 2. Lastly, N is a constant defined by the user.
Input: the internal state x (N bits)
Output: a state r of N bits
for i = 0, . . . , N do
di ← 0;
end
a← XORshift1();
m← f(a);
k ← m;
for i = 0, . . . , k do
b← XORshift2() mod N;
S ← b;
if dS = 0 then
xS ← xS ;
dS ← 1;
end
else if dS = 1 then
k ← k + 1;
end
end
r ← x;
return r;
Algorithm 2: An arbitrary round of the new
CI(XORshift,XORshift) generator
As a comparison, the basic design procedure of the old
generator is recalled in Algorithm 3 (a and b are computed
by Logistic maps, N and c > 3N are constants defined by the
user). See [13] for further informations.
Input: the internal state x (N bits)
Output: a state r of N bits
a← Logisticmap1();
if a > 0.5 then
d← 1
end
else
d← 0
end
m← d+ c;
for i = 0, . . . ,m do
b← Logisticmap2();
S ← 100000b mod N;
xS ← xS ;
end
r ← x;
return r;
Algorithm 3: An arbitrary round of the old PRNG
C. Illustrative example
In this example, N = 4 is chosen for easy understanding.
The initial state of the system x0 can be seeded by the decimal
part t of the current time. For example, if the current time
in seconds since the Epoch is 1237632934.484088, so t =
484088, then x0 = t (mod 16) in binary digits, i.e., x0 =
(0, 1, 0, 0).
To compute m sequence, Equation 3 can be adapted to this
example as follows:
mn = f(yn) =


0 if 0 6 y
n
232 <
1
16 ,
1 if 116 6
yn
232 <
5
16 ,
2 if 516 6
yn
232 <
11
16 ,
3 if 1116 6
yn
232 <
15
16 ,
4 if 1516 6
yn
232 < 1,
(3)
where y is generated by XORshift seeded with the current
time. We can see that the probabilities of occurrences of m =
0, m = 1, m = 2, m = 3, m = 4, are 116 ,
4
16 ,
6
16 ,
4
16 ,
1
16 ,
respectively. This m determines what will be the next output
x. For instance,
• If m = 0, the following x will be (0, 1, 0, 0).
• If m = 1, the following x can be (1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0),
(0, 1, 1, 0) or (0, 1, 0, 1).
• If m = 2, the following x can be (1, 0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1, 0),
(1, 1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1) or (0, 1, 1, 1).
• If m = 3, the following x can be (0, 0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1, 1),
(1, 0, 0, 1) or (1, 0, 1, 0).
• If m = 4, the following x will be (1, 0, 1, 1).
In this simulation, m = 0, 4, 2, 2, 3, 4, 1, 1, 2, 3, 0, 1, 4, ...
Additionally, b is computed with a XORshift genera-
tor too, but with another seed. We have found b =
1, 4, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 1, 1, 4, 3, 2, 1, ...
Chaotic iterations are made with initial state x0, vectorial
logical negation f0 and strategy S. The result is presented in
Table I. Let us recall that sequence m gives the states xn to
return, which are here x0, x0+4, x0+4+2, . . . So, in this exam-
ple, the output of the generator is: 10100111101111110011...
or 4,4,11,8,1...
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Key space
The PRNG proposed in this paper is based on discrete
chaotic iterations. It has an initial value x0 ∈ BN. Considering
this set of initial values alone, the key space size is equal to
2N. In addition, this new generator combines digits of two
other PRNGs. We used two different XORshifts here. Let k
be the key space of XORshift. So the total key space size is
close to 2N · k2. Lastly, the impact of Equation 2 must be
taken into account. This leads to conclude that the key space
size is large enough to withstand attacks.
B. Devaney’s chaos property
Generally, the quality of a PRNG depends, to a large extent,
on the following criteria: randomness, uniformity, indepen-
dence, storage efficiency, and reproducibility. A chaotic se-
quence may satisfy these requirements and also other chaotic
properties, as ergodicity, entropy, and expansivity. A chaotic
sequence is extremely sensitive to the initial conditions. That
is, even a minute difference in the initial state of the system
can lead to enormous differences in the final state, even
over fairly small timescales. Therefore, chaotic sequence fits
the requirements of pseudo-random sequence well. Contrary
to XORshift, our generator possesses these chaotic proper-
ties [2],[13]. However, despite a large number of papers pub-
lished in the field of chaos-based pseudo-random generators,
m 0 4 2 2
k 0 4 +1 2 2 +1
b 1 4 2 2 3 3 4 1 1 4
d r r (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,1) (1,1,0,1) (1,1,1,1,) r (0,0,1,0) (0,0,1,1) r (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,1)
S 1 4 2 3 3 4 1 4
x0 x0 x4 x6 x8
0 0 1−→ 1 1 1 1−→ 0 0
1 1 2−→ 0 0 0 0
0 0 3−→ 1 1 3−→ 0 0 0
0 0 4−→ 1 1 4−→ 0 0 4−→ 1 1
Binary Output: x0
1
x0
2
x0
3
x0
4
x0
1
x0
2
x0
3
x0
4
x4
1
x4
2
x4
3
x4
4
x6
1
x6
2
... = 01000100101110000001...
Integer Output: x0, x0, x4, x6, x8... = 4, 4, 11, 8, 1...
Table I: Application example
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x 104
0.49
0.492
0.494
0.496
0.498
0.5
0.502
0.504
0.506
0.508
0.51
Old CI(Logistic, Logistic)
New CI(XORshift,XORshift)
n
P
Sensitivity analysis
Figure 1: Sensitivity analysis
the impact of this research is rather marginal. This is due
to the following reasons: almost all PRNG algorithms using
chaos are based on dynamical systems defined on continuous
sets (e.g., the set of real numbers). So these generators are
usually slow, requiring considerably more storage space and
lose their chaotic properties during computations. These major
problems restrict their use as generators [7].
In this paper we don’t simply integrate chaotic maps hoping
that the implemented algorithm remains chaotic. Indeed, the
PRNG we conceive is just discrete chaotic iterations and we
have proven in [2] that these iterations produce a topological
chaos as defined by Devaney: they are regular, transitive,
and sensitive to initial conditions. This famous definition
of a chaotic behavior for a dynamical system implies un-
predictability, mixture, sensitivity, and uniform repartition.
Moreover, as only integers are manipulated in discrete chaotic
iterations, the chaotic behavior of the system is preserved
during computations, and these computations are fast.
C. Key sensitivity
As a consequence of its chaotic property, this PRNG is
highly sensitive to the initial conditions. To illustrate this
property, several initial values are put into the chaotic system.
Let H be the number of differences between the sequences
obtained in this way. Suppose n is the length of these
sequences. Then the variance ratio P , defined by P = H/n,
is computed. The results are shown in Figure 1 (x axis is
sequence lengths, y axis is variance ratio P ). For the two
PRNGs, variance ratios approach 0.50, which indicates that
the system is extremely sensitive to the initial conditions.
V. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
A. Basic usual tests
1) Comparative test parameters: In this section, five well-
known statistical tests [10] are used as comparison tools.
They encompass frequency and autocorrelation tests. In what
follows, s = s0, s1, s2, . . . , sn−1 denotes a binary sequence of
length n. The question is to determine whether this sequence
possesses some specific characteristics that a truly random
sequence would be likely to exhibit. The tests are introduced
in this subsection and results are given in the next one.
Frequency test (monobit test): The purpose of this test
is to check if the numbers of 0’s and 1’s are approximately
equal in s, as it would be expected for a random sequence. Let
n0, n1 denote these numbers. The statistic used here is X1 =
(n0−n1)
2
n
, which approximately follows a χ2 distribution with
one degree of freedom when n > 107.
Serial test (2-bit test): The purpose of this test is to
determine if the number of occurrences of 00, 01, 10 and
11 as subsequences of s are approximately the same. Let
n00, n01, n10, and n11 denote the number of occurrences of
00, 01, 10, and 11 respectively. Note that n00 + n01 + n10 +
n11 = n − 1 since the subsequences are allowed to overlap.
The statistic used here is:
X2 =
4
n−1 (n
2
00 +n
2
01 + n
2
10 + n
2
11)− 2n (n20 + n21) + 1, which
approximately follows a χ2 distribution with 2 degrees of
freedom if n > 21.
Poker test: The poker test studies if each pattern of
length m (without overlapping) appears the same number of
times in s. Let ⌊ n
m
⌋ > 5 × 2m and k = ⌊ n
m
⌋. Divide the
sequence s into k non-overlapping parts, each of length m. Let
ni be the number of occurrences of the ith type of sequence
of length m, where 1 6 i 6 2m. The statistic used is
X3 =
2m
k
(
2m∑
i=1
n2i
)
− k,
which approximately follows a χ2 distribution with 2m − 1
degrees of freedom. Note that the poker test is a generalization
of the frequency test: setting m = 1 in the poker test yields
the frequency test.
Runs test: The purpose of the runs test is to figure out
whether the number of runs of various lengths in the sequence
s is as expected, for a random sequence. A run is defined as
a pattern of all zeros or all ones, a block is a run of ones,
and a gap is a run of zeros. The expected number of gaps
(or blocks) of length i in a random sequence of length n is
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
x 105
0
5
Monobits test
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
x 105
0
5
10
Serial test
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
x 105
200
300
400
Poker test
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
x 105
0
20
40
Runs test
Old CI (logistic, logistic) XORshirft Logistic map New CI (XORshirft, XORshirft)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
x 105
0
2
4
Autocorrelation absulote value
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison through various well-known tests
ei =
n−i+3
2i+2 . Let k be equal to the largest integer i such that
ei > 5. Let Bi, Gi be the number of blocks and gaps of length
i in s, for each i ∈ J1, kK. The statistic used here will then
be:
X4 =
k∑
i=1
(Bi − ei)2
ei
+
k∑
i=1
(Gi − ei)2
ei
,
which approximately follows a χ2 distribution with 2k − 2
degrees of freedom.
Autocorrelation test: The purpose of this test is to check
for coincidences between the sequence s and (non-cyclic)
shifted versions of it. Let d be a fixed integer, 1 6 d 6 ⌊n/2⌋.
The A(d) =
∑n−d−1
i=0 si ⊕ si+d is the amount of bits
not equal between the sequence and itself displaced by d
bits. The statistic used is: X5 = 2(A(d) − n−d2 )/
√
n− d,
which approximately follows a normal distribution N(0, 1) if
n− d > 10. Since small values of A(d) are as unexpected as
large values, a two-sided test should be used.
2) Comparison: We show in Table II a comparison be-
tween our new generator CI(XORshift, XORshift), its old
version denoted Old CI(Logistic, Logistic), a PRNG based
on logistic map, and a simple XORshift. Time (in seconds) is
related to the duration needed by each algorithm to generate a
2×105 bits long sequence. The test has been conducted using
the same computer and compiler with the same optimization
settings for both algorithms, in order to make the test as fair
as possible. Similar results have been achieved for different
sequence lengths (see Figure 2). The results confirm that the
proposed generator is a lot faster than the old one, while the
statistical results are better for most of the parameters, leading
to the conclusion that the new PRNG is more secure than the
old one. Although the logistic map also has good results, it
is too slow to be implemented in Internet applications.
B. NIST statistical test suite
Among the numerous standard tests for pseudo-
randomness, a convincing way to prove the quality of
the produced sequences is to confront them with the NIST
(National Institute of Standards and Technology) Statistical
Test Suite SP 800-22, released by the Information Technology
Laboratory in August 25, 2008. This package of 15 tests
Table III: SP 800-22 test results (PT )
Method Old CI New CI
Frequency (Monobit) Test 0.595549 0.474986
Frequency Test within a Block 0.554420 0.897763
Runs Test 0.455937 0.816537
Longest Run of Ones in a Block Test 0.016717 0.798139
Binary Matrix Rank Test 0.616305 0.262249
Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test 0.000190 0.007160
Non-overlapping Template Matching Test* 0.532252 0.449916
Overlapping Template Matching Test 0.334538 0.514124
Maurers Universal Statistical Test 0.032923 0.678686
Linear Complexity Test 0.401199 0.657933
Serial Test* (m=10) 0.013396 0.425346
Approximate Entropy Test (m=10) 0.137282 0.637119
Cumulative Sums (Cusum) Test* 0.046464 0.279680
Random Excursions Test* 0.503622 0.287409
Random Excursions Variant Test* 0.347772 0.486686
Success 15/15 15/15
(a) The original image (b) The watermark
Figure 3: Original images
was developed to measure the randomness of (arbitrarily
long) binary sequences produced by either hardware or
software based cryptographic (pseudo-)random number
generators. These tests focus on a variety of different types
of non-randomness that could occur in such sequences.
In our experiments, 100 sequences (s = 100) of 1,000,000
bits are generated and tested. If the value PT of any test is
smaller than 0.0001, the sequences are considered to not be
good enough and the generator is unsuitable. Table III shows
PT of the sequences based on discrete chaotic iterations using
different schemes. If there are at least two statistical values
in a test, this test is marked with an asterisk and the average
value is computed to characterize the statistical values. We
can conclude from Table III that both the old generator and
CI(XORshift, XORshift) have successfully passed the NIST
statistical test suite.
VI. APPLICATION EXAMPLE IN DIGITAL WATERMARKING
In this section, an application example is given in the
field of digital watermarking: a watermark is encrypted and
embedded into a cover image using the scheme presented
in [1] and CI(XORshift, XORshift). The carrier image is the
well-known Lena, which is a 256 grayscale image, and the
watermark is the 64 × 64 pixels binary image depicted in
Figure 3.
The watermark is encrypted by using chaotic iterations: the
initial state x0 is the watermark, considered as a boolean vec-
tor, the iteration function is the vectorial logical negation, and
Table II: Comparison with Old CI(Logistic, Logistic) for a 2× 105 bits sequence
Method Monobit Serial Poker Runs Autocorrelation Time
Logistic map 0.1280 0.1302 240.2893 26.5667 0.0373 0.965s
XORshift 1.7053 2.1466 248.9318 18.0087 -0.5009 0.096s
Old CI(Logistic, Logistic) 1.0765 1.0796 258.1069 20.9272 -1.6994 0.389s
New CI(XORshift,XORshift) 0.3328 0.7441 262.8173 16.7877 -0.0805 0.197s
(a) Differences with the
original
(b) The encrypted water-
mark
Figure 4: Encrypted watermark and differences
the chaotic strategy (Sk)k∈N is defined with CI(XORshift,
XORshift), where initial parameters constitute the secret key
and N = 64. Thus, the encrypted watermark is the last
boolean vector generated by these chaotic iterations. An
example of such an encryption is given in Figure 4.
Let L be the 2563 booleans vector constituted by the three
last bits of each pixel of Lena and Uk defined by:{
U0 = S0
Un+1 = Sn+1 + 2× Un + n [mod 2563] (4)
The watermarked Lena Iw is obtained from the original Lena,
whose three last bits are replaced by the result of 642 chaotic
iterations with initial state L and strategy U (see Figure 4).
The extraction of the watermark can be obtained in the
same way. Remark that the map θ 7→ 2θ of the torus,
which is the famous dyadic transformation (a well-known
example of topological chaos [4]), has been chosen to make
(Uk)k6642 highly sensitive to the strategy. As a consequence,
(Uk)k6642 is highly sensitive to the alteration of the image:
any significant modification of the watermarked image will
lead to a completely different extracted watermark, thus giving
a way to authenticate media through the Internet.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, the pseudo-random generator proposed in [13]
has been improved. By using XORshift instead of logistic
map and due to a rewrite of the way to generate strategies,
the generator based on chaotic iterations works faster and is
more secure. The speed and randomness of this new PRNG
has been compared to its former version, to XORshift, and to
a generator based on logistic map. This comparison shows that
CI(XORshift, XORshift) offers a sufficient speed and level of
security for a whole range of Internet usages as cryptography
and data hiding.
In future work, we will continue to try to improve the speed
and security of this PRNG, by exploring new strategies and
iteration functions. Its chaotic behavior will be deepened by
using the various tools provided by the mathematical theory
of chaos. New statistical tests will be used to compare this
PRNG to existing ones. Additionally a probabilistic study of
its security will be done. Lastly, new applications in computer
science will be proposed, especially in the Internet security
field.
REFERENCES
[1] J. M. Bahi and C. Guyeux. A new chaos-based watermarking
algorithm. In SECRYPT 2010, International conference on
security and cryptography, pages ***–***, Athens, Greece,
2010. To appear.
[2] J. M. Bahi and C. Guyeux. Topological chaos and chaotic
iterations, application to hash functions. WCCI’10: 2010
IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence, Accepted
paper, 2010.
[3] S. Cecen, R. M. Demirer, and C. Bayrak. A new hybrid nonlin-
ear congruential number generator based on higher functional
power of logistic maps. Chaos, Solitons and Fractals, 42:847–
853, 2009.
[4] R. L. Devaney. An Introduction to Chaotic Dynamical Systems.
Redwood City: Addison-Wesley, 2nd edition, 1989.
[5] M. Falcioni, L. Palatella, S. Pigolotti, and A. Vulpiani. Prop-
erties making a chaotic system a good pseudo random number
generator. arXiv, nlin/0503035, 2005.
[6] D. E. Knuth. The Art of Computer Programming, Volume 2:
Seminumerical Algorithms. Addison-Wesley, 1998.
[7] L. Kocarev. Chaos-based cryptography: a brief overview. IEEE
Circ Syst Mag, 7:6–21, 2001.
[8] P. L’ecuyer. Comparison of point sets and sequences for quasi-
monte carlo and for random number generation. SETA 2008,
LNCS 5203:1–17, 2008.
[9] G. Marsaglia. Xorshift rngs. Journal of Statistical Software,
8(14):1–6, 2003.
[10] A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone. Handbook of
applied cryptography. CRC Press, 1997.
[11] NIST Special Publication 800-22 rev. 1. A statistical test
suite for random and pseudorandom number generators for
cryptographic applications. August 2008.
[12] F. Robert. Discrete Iterations. A Metric Study, volume 6.
Springer Series in Computational Mathematics, 1986.
[13] Q. Wang, C. Guyeux, and J. M. Bahi. A novel pseudo-random
generator based on discrete chaotic iterations for cryptographic
applications. INTERNET ’09, pages 71–76, 2009.
[14] F. Zheng, X. Tian, J. Song, and X. Li. Pseudo-random sequence
generator based on the generalized henon map. The Journal of
China Universities of Posts and Telecommunications, 15(3):64–
68, 2008.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x 104
0.4
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.5
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
Sensitivity analysis
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Correlation distribution of the encrypted image
050
100
150
200
250
300
350
The histogram of encrypted image
0 50 100 150 200 250
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x 104
0.49
0.492
0.494
0.496
0.498
0.5
0.502
0.504
0.506
0.508
0.51
Old CI(Logistic, Logistic)
New CI(XORshift,XORshift)
n
P
500 1000 1500 2000
FFT
500 1000 1500 2000
FFT

